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The public finance literature demonstrates the equivalence between consumption and labor-
income (wage) taxes. We introduce an experimental paradigm in which individuals make real 
labor-leisure choices and spend their earned income on real goods. We use this paradigm to 
test whether a labor-income tax and an equivalent consumption tax lead to identical labor-
leisure allocations. Despite controlling for subjects’ work ability and inherent labor-leisure 
preferences and disallowing saving, subjects reduce their labor supply significantly more in 
response to an income tax than to an equivalent consumption tax. We discuss the economic 
implications of a policy shift to a consumption tax. 
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Since Hobbes (1651) and continuing with Mill (1871), the question of whether to tax con-
sumption or income has occupied a central place in tax policy debate. In January 2005,
President George W. Bush commissioned a panel to simplify the federal tax code and render
it more equitable, ecient and conducive to economic growth (President's Advisory Panel
on Tax Reform 2005). The panel considered numerous national sales tax plans to replace
the entire income tax system as well as a detailed value added tax program to allow for a
reduction in individual and corporate income tax rates. The complexity of replacing the cur-
rent tax code with a broad-based consumption tax system inhibited the panel from reaching
a consensus. Notwithstanding, such a shift remains high on the tax reform agenda.
The classic Haig-Simons denition (according to which income equals consumption plus
changes in wealth (savings)) highlights that the major distinction between an income tax (on
all income sources) and a consumption tax is the former's taxation of savings. The taxation
of savings distorts the taxpayer's intertemporal consumption allocation, an often-invoked
argument in favor of shifting to a consumption tax. In a second-best setting, redistributive
goals may justify the taxation of savings despite its distortive eects. A long public nance
literature beginning with Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) (AS) addresses the desirability of
using commodity taxation for redistributive purposes as a supplement to an optimal labor
income (wage) tax. Using Mirrlees' (1971) standard setting, AS show that when preferences
over the set of consumption goods are separable from leisure, the optimal commodity tax
must be uniform; namely, all consumption goods are subject to the same tax rate. An
implication of this pioneering result is that future and present consumption should be taxed
at the same rate. In other words, the taxation of savings is undesirable. AS and a large
body of subsequent literature1 are premised on the equivalence between a linear wage tax
1 Extensions of the AS result include Deaton (1979) who shows that even when labor income tax is
restricted to be linear (at rate cum universal demo grant), separability and homotheticity of preferences
render commodity taxation redundant. More recently, Saez (2002) extends the AS framework to allow for
preference heterogeneity and Kaplow (2006) demonstrates that commodity taxation may be redundant even
1and a comprehensive uniform consumption tax.2 In fact, wage taxes can be thought as
pre-paid consumption taxes, while consumption taxes like the VAT and retail sales taxes are
viewed as post-paid consumption taxes. In the absence of behavioral evidence of any sort,
the literature regards these two taxes as equivalent.3
In this paper, we oer the rst test of the equivalence between consumption and wage
taxes. To do so, we introduce a new experimental paradigm in which both work and leisure
choices earn subjects payments in real goods. This paradigm consists of an incentivized, two-
stage individual choice problem that requires subjects to allocate their time between leisure
(rewarded with a payment for each unit consumed) and a real-eort task. Their performance
at the real-eort task in the rst stage earns them income, which they allocate in the second
stage between two consumption goods. After gaining experience in this environment, we
introduce a tax. In the labor income tax (IT) treatment, a 50-percent at wage tax is
imposed on earned income. In the equivalent consumption tax (CT) treatment, a 100-
percent ad-valorem tax is levied on both consumption goods. No savings are permitted in
either treatment. Notice that both tax regimes entail a 50-percent erosion in the individual's
purchasing power without changing the relative prices of the consumption goods. In other
words, both tax treatments present subjects with the same budget constraint. Controlling
for dierences in labor market productivity and inherent labor-leisure preferences using pre-
tax treatments, we test whether these two equivalent tax regimes in fact lead to identical
labor-leisure choices.
Although we have designed these two tax treatments to be theoretically equivalent, we
when the labor income tax schedule is not set at the optimum.
2 In a neo-classical framework, any two tax schedules that yield the same choice set for a rational individual
should have no impact on individual choice (nor on government scal considerations) and hence should be
equivalent for tax design. The public nance literature demonstrates the equivalency of several other pairs
of tax instruments that are prima facie dierent. Notable examples include social security taxes levied on
employees and employers and commodity taxes imposed on producers and consumers.
3 This theoretical equivalence hinges on the standard assumption of constant returns to scale. In economies
exhibiting decreasing-returns-to-scale technologies, Helpman and Sadka (1982) demonstrate that wage taxes
are always welfare inferior to consumption taxes.
2propose a behavioral hypothesis that suggests individuals will work more and consume less
leisure in the CT treatment than in the equivalent IT treatment. Our hypothesis is based
on money illusion, that is, individuals' observed tendency to think in nominal rather than
real terms. An individual suering from money illusion will typically display a reluctance to
accept a nominal wage cut or to sell a house at a nominal loss.4 Likewise, we anticipate
individuals to respond more adversely to a nominal wage cut (due to a wage tax) than to a
reduction in the real wage rate (due to a consumption tax). In our experimental framework,
we expect that this dierential reaction will translate into individuals choosing to work
less under a wage tax than under an equivalent (measured in real purchasing power terms)
consumption tax. Put dierently, we predict that individuals will underestimate the burden
associated with an indirect consumption tax (that erodes real purchasing power via price
increases) relative to the corresponding burden associated with a direct wage tax.
Our results corroborate our conjectures and appear consistent with the money illusion
explanation. Indeed, individuals in IT reduce their labor supply by 1/3 on average compared
to the no-tax treatment, signicantly more than the 15% decrease in labor supply in CT.
The labor supply elasticities with respect to the net real wage are 0.56 in IT and 0.24 in
CT. Furthermore, this dierential labor supply response across tax treatments holds over
the entire range of labor market abilities and persists over time. This nding bears major
implications for tax policy design by establishing a novel perceptual argument for shifting
to a consumption tax base.
While ours is the rst test of the equivalence between an income and a consumption
tax, several authors have tested experimentally the equivalence between the economic and
statutory incidence of a unit commodity tax (also known as liability side tax equivalence
theorem) (see Borck et al. 2001, Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (KK) 2000, Riedl and Tyran
4 See Shar et al. (1997) for early survey evidence on money illusion as well as Fehr and Tyran (2001,
2007) for experimental evidence and Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008), Cohen et al. (2005) and Kooreman
et al. (2004) for empirical evidence.
32005 and Rue 2005). The results from these papers suggest that whether the economic
incidence of a unit tax is, in fact, independent of the side of the market that bears the
statutory incidence, as the theory predicts, depends on the competitiveness of the market.5
Our paper contributes to a recent fast-growing strand in the public nance literature
on the misperception of taxes. Sausgruber and Tyran (2004) demonstrate that buyers sys-
tematically underestimate the tax burden of a tax levied on sellers and the consequences of
this misperception for preferences for redistribution. Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) and
Feldman and Katuscak (2009) focus on individuals' misperception of the dierence between
marginal and average tax rates. In a series of tax and redistribution decision-making scenar-
ios, McCaery and Baron (2006) elicit attitudes toward various scal policies and nd that
subjects prefer hidden to transparent taxes and ignore the longer-term eects of tax policies.
Based on a grocery store eld experiment and empirical state-level data on alcohol sales,
Chetty et al. (2009) show that posting sales-tax-inclusive prices renders the tax more salient
and thus reduces consumer demand relative to adding the sales tax at the cash register.
Finkelstein (2009) demonstrates that toll rates increase in response to a switch from manual
collection (where drivers pay in cash) to a less salient electronic collection system (where
drivers are automatically debited).6
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section we present a simple theo-
retical framework to illustrate the mechanism underlying our main experimental hypothesis
and, to the extent that this hypothesis nds validation, the potential welfare gain from a
shift to a consumption tax. In section 3, we detail the experimental design and procedures.
Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
5 KK represents the lone violation of the theory and their test uses a bilateral-monopoly market structure.
6 Salience may be the source of the money illusion we hypothesize in our setup. Wage taxes are tantamount
to a direct wage cut; whereas price increases due to an equivalent consumption tax are more subtle and may
go undetected. In the next section, we invoke the more general notion of misperception to model individuals'
under-reaction to the consumption tax.
42 An Illustrative Model of Agents' Misperception
Before turning to the focus of our paper, namely, the experimental test, we present a simple
behavioral model designed merely to highlight a role for misperception in individuals' labor-
leisure decisions. In particular, this model illustrates our main nding that individuals choose
a higher labor supply under a consumption tax than under an equivalent labor income tax.
The model also demonstrates the potential welfare gain associated with a shift from a labor
income to a consumption tax regime.
Consider a standard labor supply model with a representative individual whose utility is
given by U(c;`) = c h(`), where c denotes consumption, ` denotes labor and h is assumed
to be strictly increasing and strictly convex.7
The production function employs labor only and exhibits constant returns to scale. We
denote by w > 0 the individual's hourly productivity (hence the competitive wage rate).
We normalize the price of the consumption good to unity, without loss of generality. The
individual is faced with the following (perceived) budget constraint:
`  w  (1   t) +  = c  (1 +   s); (1)
where t < 1 is the (at) tax rate on labor income (wages),  denotes a lump-sum transfer
(a tax if negative) and s is the tax rate on consumption. The parameter 0    1
measures the individual's degree of misperception, possibly a result of money illusion (see our
discussion in the Introduction). When  = 1 the individual is fully rational and perceives the
consumption tax and the corresponding budget constraint correctly, in accordance with neo-
classical consumer theory. When  < 1 the individual underestimates the burden associated
with a consumption tax.8 Based on his perceived budget constraint in (1), the individual
7 Given the illustrative nature of our model, we assume a quasi-linear specication, which rules out income
eects, to render our exposition more tractable. See Diamond (1998) and Salanie (2003) for applications in
the optimal income tax literature.
8 Chetty et al. (2009) employ a similar formulation to study the role of tax salience in consumer purchasing
decisions. In our model, tax misperception is exogenously given and is measured along a continuum, whereas
5determines his labor supply and earns the commensurate income. Finally, he spends this
income on the consumption good, subject (regrettably) to the true budget constraint (as if
 = 1 in (1)).
We now demonstrate that when the individual underestimates the consumption tax bur-
den, levying a consumption tax entails a smaller excess burden than that associated with
an equivalent wage tax (while the individual is indierent between the two tax regimes).
Formally, we prove the following:
Proposition: When  < 1, for any wage tax there exists a consumption tax that generates
strictly higher tax revenues while leaving the individual's utility unchanged.
Proof: See the Appendix.
From the proof of the proposition, we observed that a shift from a wage tax to a theo-
retically equivalent consumption tax induces an agent who underestimates the burden of a
consumption tax ( < 1) to work longer. This shift yields higher tax revenues, but, at the
same time, reduces the agent's utility. We demonstrated that by lowering the consumption
tax rate below this theoretically equivalent level, tax revenues remain higher than those ob-
tained under the wage tax while restoring the agent's utility to UWT. This establishes the
eciency gain from a shift to a consumption tax.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
To test the equivalency between labor income and consumption taxes, we design two tax
systems that yield identical after-tax budget lines, thereby creating identical labor-leisure in-
centives. In a between-subjects design, we determine whether subjects indeed make the same
labor-leisure allocation as predicted by the theory or whether, according to our alternative
Chetty et al. treat individuals' misperception as a costly binary choice between full attention and complete
inattention to the sales tax added at the cash register to the posted price.
6hypothesis, subjects choose to work more in the consumption-tax condition. This compari-
son of labor-leisure choices in equivalent labor income tax and consumption tax treatments
is the third part of our three-part experiment. The rst two parts of the experiment are
designed to measure and control for subjects' work ability and inherent labor-leisure pref-
erences, respectively. We detail in turn each of these three parts below. The experimental
instructions for all three parts appear in the Appendix.
3.1 Three Parts of the Experiment
a. Part One (Work Ability)
The common element to all three parts of the experiment is the real-eort work task: each
subject solves by hand two-digit by two-digit multiplication questions. Part One serves to
measure each subject's innate ability or productivity at this task. Our objective is to create
a labor income tax and a theoretically equivalent consumption tax treatment balanced in
terms of subjects' work abilities.
To measure each subject's work ability, subjects are asked to solve as many multiplication
problems as they can in three minutes. To incentivize subjects, they are paid 0.5 shekel for
each correctly answered question.9 Throughout this and the other two parts, the subject
may observe both his numbers of correctly and incorrectly answered multiplication questions
and his cumulative earnings. (See the screenshot for Part One in the Appendix.)
At the completion of Part One, while subjects proceeded to Part Two, the software
ranked subjects according to the number of correctly solved multiplication questions. We
applied the rank-sorting algorithm displayed in Table 1 to assign each subject to either the
labor income tax or consumption tax treatment in Part Three. At the beginning of Part
Three, each subject receives the instructions only for the treatment to which he has been
9 One $USD equals about 3.5 Israeli shekels. To control for question diculty across subjects, all subjects
saw the same series of randomly chosen multiplication questions in the same order. To reduce the variance
in question diculty across questions, we excluded integers ending in \0" or \1".
7assigned. Subjects are not made aware of the ranking algorithm, their overall ranking or the
existence of the other tax treatment in which they do not participate.
[insert Table 1 here]
The algorithm balances the two tax treatments in terms of the rankings of subjects'
work abilities. Table 1 indicates how this balance is achieved: the subjects with the highest
and fourth highest abilities are assigned to the consumption tax treatment (CT), while the
second and third highest ranking subjects are assigned to the labor income tax treatment
(IT). This \snake" pattern of subject assignment continues until all subjects are exhausted.
The result is that if the number of subjects in a session is a multiple of four, the average
ability ranking of the two treatments is identical; otherwise, the average ranking diers by
a mere fraction for sessions with at least 17 subjects (applicable to all four of our sessions).
b. Part Two (Labor-Leisure Preferences)
The second part of the experiment measures subjects' (pre-tax) labor-leisure preferences.
This second part consists of a two-stage, full-information, individual choice problem. In the
rst labor-leisure-allocation stage, the individual decides how much of the available three
minutes to devote to work in the form of solving multiplication problems. For each correctly
answered question, the subject earns two points that may be exchanged for either of the
two consumption goods in the second stage (as explained below). The subject may stop
working at any time during the three-minute round by pressing the \Stop" button. For
each 15 seconds that the individual chooses not to work (leisure), he earns one unit of the
leisure good (a voucher for a bottled soft drink).10 (Fractions of 15 seconds left on the
clock are worthless.) In the second, consumption stage of the round, the individual decides
how to allocate the points earned from the labor task between the two consumption goods
10 Because subjects are conned to the lab for the duration of the experiment, the use of a leisure good
ensures that they indeed derive utility from the time not spent working.
8(vouchers redeemable for falafel sandwiches or pizza slices). In this pre-tax treatment, each
point earned can be exchanged for a half falafel sandwich or one pizza slice.11
Compared to Part One, this second part complicates the subject's decision task in two
respects: the subject must rst decide how to allocate his three-minute endowment between
labor and leisure, and he must subsequently decide how to allocate his earned income between
the two consumption goods. Due to these additional complexities, we want to allow the
subject to repeat Part Two. At the same time, we recognize that solving multiplication
questions is mentally fatiguing and that this part's main purpose is really to provide a
control for subjects' preferences. We resolved these tradeos by having each subject play
two rounds of Part Two.
c. Part Three (Income tax or Consumption tax)
Part Three of the experiment is identical to Part Two, except that the subject now faces
either a labor income tax or a consumption tax, depending on the treatment to which he is
assigned (according to the sorting algorithm described in Part One). In the labor income
tax treatment (IT), a 50% wage tax is imposed on subjects' earnings, meaning that for each
correctly answered multiplication question the subject earns one point (instead of two).12
The prices of half falafel sandwiches and pizza slices remain the same as in the pre-tax
treatment, namely, one point each.
Alternatively, in the consumption tax treatment (CT), a 100% consumption tax is im-
posed on each of the two consumption goods, meaning that a half falafel sandwich and a slice
of pizza now each cost two points (instead of one point each). As in the pre-tax treatment,
the value of a correctly answered question is two points.
The key feature of these two tax treatments is that the subjects in each treatment face
11 Pizza and falafel are the two most popular fast foods in Israel. Pizza is sold whole and by the slice;
falafel sandwiches are served in a half or full pita bread.
12 This treatment exemplies the need to convert correct answers to smaller units. If we had paid subjects
directly in correctly answered questions, a subject who answers an odd number of questions would be left
with a fraction of a question after the wage tax.
9the identical post-tax budget line: a half falafel sandwich and one pizza slice each cost one
correctly answered multiplication question, while each soft drink costs 15 seconds not spent
on solving multiplication questions.13 As an additional control and so as to eliminate
the tax framing eect observed in Chetty et al. (2009), we presented to subjects the tax-
inclusive income and tax-inclusive prices of the consumption goods in each of the respective
tax treatments. See the screenshots in Part 3 of the Appendix.
The decision complexity of Part Three suggests that allowing subjects to repeat it will
provide us with more informed estimates of their preferences. At the same time, mental
fatigue and the intensity associated with solving multiplication problems under time pressure
severely limits the number of feasible repetitions. Given the centrality of this part of the
experiment, we chose to have each subject play three rounds.
3.2 Subjects and Payments
To ensure that our results are not attributable to subjects' misunderstanding of the rules of
the experiment or the implications of the tax, we gave subjects a short quiz prior to beginning
Parts Two and Three to verify their knowledge of the prices of all goods.14 More important
for understanding, we limited participation to economics students. Eighty undergraduate
majors in economics participated in one of four sessions at Ben-Gurion University. The entire
experiment took about one hour and 45 minutes. The average cash payment from Part One
was 3.0 NIS, while the average payments in vouchers based on one randomly chosen round
from both Parts Two and Three were 7.7 bottled drinks, 6.3 half falafel sandwiches and 7.0
13 To illustrate the equivalence, consider a subject who correctly answers ve questions in 120 seconds,
leaving 60 seconds on the clock. In both IT and CT, the 60 seconds not devoted to the work task earn the
subject four units of the leisure good, bottled soft drinks. In IT, ve questions pay ve after-tax points,
exchangeable for ve half falafel sandwiches, ve pizza slices or some combination thereof. In CT, ve
questions pay ten points, but the 100% tax on consumption goods make them exchangeable also for ve half
falafel sandwiches, ve pizza slices or some combination thereof.
14 The subject answered the same set of questions in either IT or CT as in the previous no-tax treatment.
The fact that the answers change from the no-tax to the tax treatment highlights for the subject the eect
of the tax on prices.
10pizza slices. The vouchers were valid for redemption for up to one year.
3.3 Logic underlying Design Choices
Our experimental design is non-standard in several respects. Perhaps the most distinctive
feature of our design is the payment in kind, rather than in cash. We steered away from cash
or cash equivalents such as cell-phone credit in the choice of goods in order to avoid a corner
solution in subjects' labor-leisure allocation. Put dierently, if either the leisure good or one
of the consumption goods were overly attractive, subjects may have exclusively chosen this
good and remained insensitive to the imposition of a tax.15
We include two consumption goods along with the leisure good to capture in the simplest
way the two typical tradeos faced by individuals: time allocation between labor and leisure
and earned-income allocation between commodities. We selected in-kind goods that are
similarly attractive to one another for a wide range of students. In choosing three similarly
well liked goods we aim, again, to minimize the number of subjects opting for a corner
solution and to create sucient variation across subjects' labor-leisure allocation decisions
to provide a persuasive test of the equivalence of the two tax regimes. Months prior to the
experiment, we conducted a questionnaire to determine the set of goods to include in our
design. The questionnaire elicits subjects' preferences over dierent bundles of goods. The
results revealed that falafel and pizza are equally well liked substitutes and neither is chosen
to the exclusion of the leisure good, soft drinks, which serves as a complement.16
15 The reader may wonder why participants don't simply choose all labor or all leisure according to the
decision that maximizes the total monetary value of the vouchers, subject to their labor market ability and
the real wage rate. After the experiment, they could then sell or trade excess vouchers and purchase at market
price the goods they did not consume during the experiment. The answer is that these vouchers (familiar
only to the subjects in these experiments) are likely to trade at a substantial market discount. In addition,
the number of bottled drinks, falafel sandwiches or pizza slices potentially earned from either complete labor-
market or leisure specialization in this experiment would greatly exceed many subjects' optimal quantity of
this good in a year. Even students value a diversied diet. The paucity of observed corner solutions in our
experiments validates this reasoning.
16 The questionnaire asked each subject to allocate a hypothetical income among three goods in each
of the distinct bundles of goods. We conducted this questionnaire on 69 students at locations (Tel Aviv
11Payment according to subjects' cumulative earnings across all rounds would invite sati-
ation, which would lead to dierent labor-leisure-consumption choices across rounds. This
between-round variation is undesirable since it is an artifact of the payment calculation.
Accordingly, each subject was paid based on his results from one randomly chosen round
from each of the second and third parts of the experiment. This payment method serves to
avoid scenarios in which subjects concentrate their labor supply in one round and opt for
leisure in the remaining round(s) of the treatment.
Our experiment consists of three parts with the rst two parts serving as controls. The
rst part allows us to balance the work-ability composition of the IT and CT treatments and
to explain a subject's labor-leisure choice as a function of his observed labor productivity.
The second part provides a within-subject control for inherent labor-leisure preferences.
The time dierence the subject devotes to the work task between the tax and the pre-tax
treatments will serve as one of our dependent measures.
There is also an important between-subject aspect of the design that merits mention.
Exposing all subjects to both tax treatments one after the other risks making transparent
their equivalency, thereby unintentionally suggesting to subjects that they are expected to
make identical labor-leisure choices. Moreover, order eects are non-existent in a between-
subject design and session eects are rendered irrelevant since subjects in each session are
equally divided between the two tax treatments.
A number of design choices were made to enhance the external validity of our results. The
instructions to participants, for instance, explain the tax on goods and the tax on income
precisely as such. In fact, the language of the instructions was purposely chosen to reect
the labor-leisure decisions and the taxation of goods and income outside of the laboratory.
To frame our experiment in more neutral terms would subject our results to the critique
University and Sapir College) dierent from the site of our experiments (Ben-Gurion University) to avoid
any subjects from participating in both the questionnaire and subsequent experiment. The detailed ndings
from the questionnaire are available upon request.
12that they may not be robust to a more realistic setting. Also, the subject repeated the same
labor-leisure choice to allow for learning from the environment and past decisions. Finally,
we recruited economics majors only. If economics students underestimate the impact of
a reduction in real income through higher prices of consumption goods, as hypothesized,
resulting in dierential labor supply across the two tax treatments, then all the more so with
a less savvy subject pool more susceptible to tax misperception.
4 Results
Descriptive statistics for the two tax treatments (IT and CT) appear in Table 2. The rst row
conrms the eectiveness of the ability-sorting algorithm in balancing the two tax treatments
in terms of subjects' abilities. The average ability in IT is 5.87 questions compared to 5.60
questions in CT. A t-test of means (p = 0:64) and the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test of distributions (z = 0:427, p = 0:67) both indicate that abilities are similarly
distributed in the two tax treatments.
[insert Table 2 here]
The next three rows display the overall average time (in seconds) devoted to labor supply
in the pre-tax treatment (before subjects knew of their assignment to, or even the existence
of, the tax treatment), the tax treatment and the change between these two treatments,
respectively. These numbers reveal that on average the substitution eect dominates any
possible positive income eect: subjects respond to the imposition of a tax by signicantly
reducing their labor supply in both treatments (p < :01 for both IT and CT). Of greater
interest, subjects reduce their labor supply by 1/3 or 44.5 seconds on average in IT compared
to the no-tax treatment, while in CT the decrease is only about 15% of the no-tax amount or
a 20.3-second decline on average. The dierence in these dierences of each subject's average
response to the two taxes is 24.2 seconds (s:d: = 10:5) and is signicant at the 2% level.
13Namely, subjects' labor supply is signicantly more responsive to the income tax than the
consumption tax, as hypothesized. The implied arc elasticities of labor supply with respect
to the real net wage are 0.56 in IT and 0.24 in CT. The dierential reaction to the two taxes
can also be seen in the distribution of subjects' average labor supply responses displayed
in Figure 1. A higher fraction of subjects in IT reduce their labor supply and by a larger
amount in response to the tax than in CT.
[insert Figure 1 here]
The gure also reveals that about a quarter of the subjects (21/80) curiously increase
their time devoted to the work task following the introduction of the tax. Also in line with
our hypothesis, 13 of these participated in CT compared to only eight in IT.
We examined the two groups to determine whether observable dierences may explain
their dierential reactions to the tax. Table 3 shows no signicant dierences in terms of
gender composition, labor market ability, pre-tax labor supply or leisure choices between
those who lowered and those who raised their post-tax labor supply. The similarity of these
two groups in terms of ability and labor supply contradicts the conventional depiction of the
backward-bending portion of the labor supply curve as applicable to high-income individuals:
there is nothing distinctive about the subjects with a negative income elasticity.17
[insert Table 3 here]
Returning to our main result, regressions (1) and (2) of Table 4 report highly signicant
dierence-in-dierence estimates, with the subject's own labor market ability (abilityi), mea-
sured as the number of multiplication questions subject i correctly answered in Part One, as
17 One explanation for this seemingly irrational behavior is that the subject aspires to a target income in
order to purchase a specic number of falafel sandwiches or pizza slices. To achieve this, the subject works
longer in the presence of the tax than in its absence. Camerer et al. (1997) found that New York City cab
drivers { another not particularly high income group { set a daily earnings target, which led them to work
longer hours on slow days and to quit early on busy days. See Farber (2005) and Fehr and G otte (2007) for
critiques of this nding.
14a control in (2). The coecients of  24:2 and  23:9 on the treatment indicator IT reveals
that subjects reduce their labor supply by an additional 24 seconds on average in response
to the income tax compared to the equivalent consumption tax. The coecient on abilityi
in (2) is small and not signicantly dierent from zero.
[insert Table 4 here]
Let us now make use of the entire panel dataset for all 80 subjects, each of whom par-
ticipated in two no-tax rounds and three tax rounds facing either an income tax (IT) or a
consumption tax (CT). Regressions (3) { (6) in Table 4 report the regression results with
subject i's labor supply in round t in seconds as the dependent variable. The random-eects
GLS regression results in (2) reveal that subjects reduce their labor supply by 39 seconds on
average when exposed to the income tax, while those who face the consumption tax work
21 seconds less compared to their pre-tax labor supply. Both of these coecients are signi-
cantly dierent from the (omitted) no-tax labor supply and signicantly dierent from each
other at less than the 1% level.
Learning is a common phenomenon in individual choice experiments. With successive
rounds a subject may become more adept at solving multiplication questions or more fa-
tigued. To determine whether subjects' labor supply decisions display a time trend, regres-
sion (3) also includes dummies for rounds 2, 4 and 5, none of which is signicantly dierent
from zero.18 In words, the only signicant reduction in subjects' labor supply occurs in
round 3 when the income or consumption tax is rst introduced. Prior to the tax, subjects
spend as much time solving multiplication problems in round 2 as in round 1. Subsequent
to the tax's introduction (rounds 4 and 5), subjects' labor supply stabilizes.
The coecients on IT, CT and the round dummies remain unchanged when the subject's
own ability at the labor task is included in regression (4). The abilityi variable is not
18 This same nding holds if we interact the round 4 and round 5 dummies separately with each of the
tax treatments.
15signicantly dierent from 0 in this or any other regression we ran, nor is it or ability2
i ever
signicant when the latter is included. In (5), we interact abilityi with both the no-tax and
the tax-inclusive rounds to allow for a subject's labor productivity to aect dierently his
labor supply in the presence of the tax. A substitution eect would render the distortive
eect of a tax more pronounced for high-ability individuals, with an income eect potentially
counteracting this pattern to some extent. The insignicance of the abilityi  tax coecient
suggests these two forces oset one another. In fact, neither of the interaction terms (or
their squared terms when included) is signicant, while the gap in the labor supply between
the two tax treatments remains highly signicant (p < :01).19
[insert Table 4 here]
To account for the fact that the decision space in our experiment is censored from below
at 0 seconds and from above at 180 seconds, we report the marginal eects from a random-
eects, double-censored Tobit regression in (6). Eleven percent of the total observations
(45 of the total 400 rounds) are right-censored with subjects devoting all of their time to
the labor market. The fact that a disproportionate number of these observations (26/45)
appear in the no-tax rounds (despite having only 2/5 tax-free rounds) attests to subjects'
labor supply sensitivity. Ten additional right-censored observations appear in CT with the
remaining nine observations in IT.
At the other extreme, because consuming all leisure involves pressing three buttons in
sequence, each located on a dierent location of the computer screen, it is physically impos-
sible to stop the clock with the entire 180 seconds intact.20 Still, the intention to consume
all leisure is revealed in 21 instances in which the subject stopped the clock between 1 and 6
19 We also tried interacting abilityi separating with IT and CT. The coecients on both interaction terms
are close to, and not signicantly dierent from, zero.
20 The subject rst needs to press the \Start" button which starts the clock, then presses \Cancel" on the
message box containing the multiplication question and nally presses the \Stop" button (see the screenshot
in the Appendix).
16seconds after the round began and didn't answer a single question. Indeed, with no instance
in which the clock was stopped after 7 to 10 seconds had elapsed, six seconds elapsed stands
out as the natural threshold for subjects desiring to consume exclusively leisure.
Revealingly, 17 of the 21 instances in which the clock was stopped before 7 seconds
elapsed occurred in IT; the other four observations being in CT with no single attempt to
consume all leisure in the no-tax treatment. Put another way, all instances of voluntary
unemployment take place after taxes are introduced, with over 80% of them in the income
tax treatment. A 2-test of proportions shows that these dierences are highly signicant
(p < :0001, df = 2).
In Tobit regression (6), the dependent variable labor supply
0
it is adjusted to take on the
value of 0 for all values 0 to 6 seconds and equals labor supplyit for all other values. As in
the GLS regressions, the marginal eects on IT and CT reported in (6) continue to dier
signicantly from zero and from one other at the 1% level. Again, neither abilityi nor any
of the round dummies is signicantly dierent from zero.21
The inability of subjects' labor market productivity to explain the variation in their labor
market allocation decision is surprising. Higher ability individuals are, by denition, more
productive in a given amount of time. If, across the spectrum of abilities, subjects' average
time devoted to the labor market is similar, then we would expect labor market earnings to
rise with ability. To examine this possibility, we regress abilityi as well as the tax treatment
indicators and round dummies on subject i's net real labor market earnings (henceforth
abbreviated as \net earnings") in round t.22
The highly signicant coecient of 0:66 on abilityi in (7) indicates that each additional
question a subject is capable of solving when he devotes the entire three minutes to the labor
21 The Tobit regression is estimated using Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 12 points of evaluation (Stata's
default). As a robustness check, we re-estimate (6) based on both 8 and 16 quadrature points. None of the
coecients changes by more than 0.001%.
22 In each of the two no-tax rounds, a subject's net earnings simply equal his gross earnings (two points
times the number of correctly answered multiplication questions), whereas net earnings are half of gross
earnings for the three tax-inclusive rounds in both IT and CT.
17task earns the subject 0:66 more points in net labor market income. In (8), we allow for
ability to explain dierentially a subject's net earnings in the tax and no-tax treatments.
Indeed, each additional unit of ability translates into 0:85 additional points of income per
round in the no-tax treatment compared to 0:46 points per round in the tax treatments.
Since abilities are similarly distributed across tax treatments, our main nding that
subjects reduce their labor supply by a larger amount in IT than in CT should translate
into more sharply reduced labor market earnings with the introduction of the tax in IT than
in CT. The 16.4-point drop in net labor income in IT is in fact signicantly larger than the
14.8-point decrease in net labor income in CT (p = :038). The IT and CT estimates are
robust to the alternative specication of abilityi in (8) and continue to dier signicantly
from one another (p = :045).
5 Conclusions
Two often-raised arguments in favor of a shift to a consumption tax are its administrative
advantages compared to an income tax (i.e., simplicity of measuring consumption versus la-
bor income and ease of collection and enforcement) and the elimination of the inter-temporal
distortion of consumption allocation caused by the taxation of capital income (see McCaf-
fery 2002). Our paper uncovers evidence for an additional, perceptual advantage: post-paid
consumption taxes encourage higher labor supply than equivalent pre-paid wage taxes. This
result holds for both men and women and across the spectrum of labor market productivities.
Consumption taxes also appear to reduce the likelihood of voluntary unemployment. These
ndings violate the equivalence between these labor-income and consumption taxes upon
which the optimal tax literature is premised and oer the potential for a welfare-improving
government response, as our simple theoretical model demonstrates.
Much of the policy reform debate in the U.S. favors a pre-paid consumption tax such as
18the individual cash-ow tax (that could take the form of a traditional Section 408 Individual
Retirement Account), which is essentially a wage tax, over a post-paid consumption tax
(such as VAT) as a candidate to replace income tax. Our evidence, to the contrary, makes
a case for adopting the latter, since post-paid consumption taxes appear to mitigate labor
disincentives, thereby enhancing the eciency of the tax system.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition: Consider a wage tax regime (BWT in Figure 2); that is, we set t > 0
and s =  = 0. Denote the wage tax rate by tWT. Let `WT and UWT denote the individual's choice
of labor supply under the wage tax regime and his corresponding utility level, respectively. Let
`NT be the individual's choice of labor supply under a no-tax regime (i.e., setting s = t =  = 0,
given by BNT in Figure 2). By virtue of our quasi-linear specication, `NT equals the choice of
labor supplied under a lump-sum tax regime (i.e., setting  < 0 and s = t = 0 ), which entails
no deadweight loss. Note further that `NT > `WT, since labor supply is strictly increasing with
respect to the net-of-tax wage rate. Denote by cNT the implicit solution to:
U(cNT;`NT) = UWT: (2)
In words, cNT is the level of consumption that yields the individual the same utility level as that
obtained under a wage tax regime when the individual works `NT hours.
[insert Figure 2 here]
We rst examine the simple case  = 0. Consider a consumption tax regime (i.e., s > 0 and
t =  = 0). Denote the consumption tax rate by sCT, where sCT is given by the implicit solution
to:
`NT  w = cNT  (1 + sCT): (3)
In words, the consumption tax rate is set such that the consumption-labor pair (cNT; `NT) lies on
the after-tax budget line BCT shown in Figure 2. Since  = 0 (implying the individual is oblivious
to the tax), an individual faced with the consumption tax regime chooses to work `NT hours. His
resultant utility equals UWT according to (2). The tax revenues raised by the consumption tax
regime thus equal the tax revenues that would be raised by a lump-sum tax regime (for the same
utility level) which, by denition, are higher than the tax revenues from the wage tax regime. This
completes the proof for the case  = 0.
22We turn next to the case 0 <  < 1. Denote by `
0
the amount of labor chosen by an individual
faced with a consumption tax rate given by the implicit solution to (3). Due to the strict concavity
of the utility function, the marginal tax rate associated with the consumption tax regime is lower
than that associated with the wage tax regime; formally, 1
1+sCT > 1   tWT (alternatively, BCT
is steeper than BWT). Thus, `WT < `
0
< `NT. The rst inequality follows from both the fact
that labor supply strictly increases with respect to the net-of-tax wage rate and the individual's
misperception of the consumption tax ( < 1); whereas the second inequality follows from both the
positive slope of labor supply with respect to the net-of-tax wage rate and  > 0. Let c
0
represent
the individual's consumption level from `
0









) lies above the indierence curve UWT
(see Figure 2).
Consider now an alternative consumption tax regime. Denote the consumption tax by sWT,
where sWT is given by the implicit solution to:
`WT  w = cWT  (1 + sWT): (4)
That is, we set a consumption tax rate that yields an after-tax budget line identical to that




, respectively, the consumption level and the
amount of labor chosen by the individual faced with the consumption tax regime in (4). Similar
to the above reasoning, it follows that `WT < `
00




) < UWT. In other




) lies below the indierence curve UWT (see Figure 2). Since the utility
function is continuous, the intermediate value theorem implies that there exists some consumption
tax rate, ^ s, where sCT < ^ s < sWT, with the individual's corresponding consumption and labor
choices given by ^ c and ^ `, such that U(^ c; ^ `) = UWT (given by point A in the gure). Moreover,
`WT < ^ ` < `NT. A shift from a wage tax to a consumption tax at the rate ^ s moves the individual
along the indierence curve UWT towards the bundle (cNT; `NT) chosen under a lump-sum tax (set
to maximize tax revenues, by construction). Consequently, the tax revenues from the consumption











To balance the two tax treatments in terms of labor market productivity, subjects in
a session are assigned to either the consumption tax treatment (CT) or income tax
treatment (IT) according to the displayed ability-ranking algorithm.
Treatment
Mean Mean









∆ labor supply in IT ─ 





Averages by tax and pre-tax treatment (standard deviations below in parentheses). Labor
supply is measured in seconds, units of leisure in numbers of bottled drinks.
∆ units of leisure 2.75 40 1.41 40
-24.2**
(10.5)
pre-tax units of leisure 80 80
after-tax units of leisure 120 120
after-tax labor supply 120 120
∆ labor supply 40 40
ability 40 40
pre-tax labor supply 80 80
Table 1 - Ability-sorting algorithm
Treatment
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics by Tax Treatment
IT CT
Variable Observations ObservationsThe subject's average time devoted to the work task in the three rounds of the tax treatment minus the two-round average from the
pre-tax treatment is displayed for each subject by tax treatment. Observations are arranged in ascending order along the horizontal axis.  

































ITLower After-Tax  Higher After-Tax 















 male 46 (78.0%) 14 (66.7%)
 subjects 59 21
Means (std. deviations) by those who lowered and those who raised their
labor supply in response to introduction of the tax (CT and IT pooled).







 variable \ grouping
-6.36 -3.22




 pre-tax leisureTable 4 - Diff-in-diff, random-effects GLS and random-effects double-censored Tobit panel regressions
method  diff-in-diff diff-in-diff GLS GLS GLS Tobit GLS GLS
dependent variable ∆ ave. labor supplyi ∆ ave. labor supplyi labor supplyit labor supplyit labor supplyit labor supplyit net earningsit net earningsit
variable \ equation  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-24.2** -23.9** -38.9*** -39.0*** -36.5*** -37.6*** -16.4*** -15.0***
-10.5 (10.6) (6.0) (6.0) (7.0) (6.2) (0.9) (1.0)
-20.7*** -20.7*** -18.3*** -19.4*** -14.8*** -13.4***
(6.0) (6.0) (6.9) (6.2) (0.9) (1.0)
-1.17 0.90 0.51 0.66***





1.2 1.2 1.2 2.3 -0.30 -0.30
(5.2) (5.2) (5.2) (5.2) (0.75) (0.75)
-5.4 -5.4 -4.0 -6.8 0.26 1.09
(5.2) (5.2) (5.5) (5.2) (0.75) (0.80)
1.0 1.0 2.3 0.0 0.59 1.41*
(5.2) (5.2) (5.5) (5.2) (0.75) (0.80)
-20.3 -13.8 135.2 130.1 128.2 15.7 14.6
(7.0) (11.2) (5.2) (10.5) (10.9) (1.1) (1.2)
 Number of Obs. 80 80 400 400 400 400 400 400
  ρ --- --- .505 .508 .510 .532 .300 .296
  R
2 / Log L .06 .06 .11 .11 .11 -1817 .64 .65
*** p-value less than .01       **  p-value less than .05        *  p-value less than .10
Difference-in-difference, random-effects GLS estimates and marginal effects from random-effects, double-censored Tobit regressions with treatment 
indicators (IT, CT), the subject's own labor productivity (ability i) and round dummies as the regressors. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is subject i's average change in labor supply between the tax and no-tax treatment (1)-(2), subject i's labor supply
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Figure 2 – Efficiency gain from a shift to a Consumption Tax